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THE THIRD AGE OF HUMAN FACTORS:
FROM INDEPENDENCE TO INTERDEPENDENCE
Erik Hollnagel
MINES ParisTech, Crisis and Risk Research Centre, Sophia Antipolis, France
Since its beginning in the mid 1940s, human factors has tried to keep up with the ever
increasing demands from technological and societal developments. Looking back, the
development of human factors can be described as corresponding to three ages. In
the first age, humans were seen as too too imprecise, variable, and slow to allow the
full use of the technological potential. In the second age, humans were seen as failure
prone and unreliable, hence a challenge to system safety. In both ages, the human
was treated as an entity, as a part that could be described independently of the
whole. In the third age, humans are recognised as being necessary if work systems
are to be safe and productive. Human performance variability is accepted as the
necessary basis for effectively coping with the complexity of the work situations and
system performance is understood as the non-trivial result of interdependent parts.
1 Introduction
Human factors is today widely accepted as an essential part of industries in practically
every domain. The motivation can, of course, vary and the reasons can be as different as
regulator demands, safety concerns, efficiency issues, ergonomics, social considerations.
competitiveness, etc. The understanding of what human factors actually means is as diverse
as the motivations and can range from genuinely acknowledging the need to address human
factors issues in system design and operation, to reluctantly accepting it as something
necessary to placate a stakeholder.
While human factors by no means is a novel phenomenon, its history is not as long as it
might have been. Human factors is often defined as the science of understanding and
applying the properties of human capability to the design and development of technology-
based systems and services. From that definition it would be reasonable to expect that
human factors has existed as long as humans have used technology. That is, however, far
from being the case.
Technology has played a role in human life for thousands of years, and the concern for
how to design useful artefacts can be found as far back as in ancient Greece, 25 centuries
ago (Marmaras et al., 1999). Technology, however, developed relatively slowly until the
Industrial Revolution in the second half of the 18th Century. This brought about a
fundamental change in the nature of work, specifically that machines became an integral part
of work. In the first stage machines were a source of power only, but technological ingenuity
soon expanded their role to control and regulation, thereby enabling machines to become
independent of humans at the same time as humans became dependent on machines. The
industrial revolution thus introduced what we today know as the human-machine system.
Machines were initially used in the mining and manufacturing industries (the first cotton
factory driven by steam opened in Manchester in 1789), but the railways soon followed when
the first inter-city passenger railway opened between Liverpool and Manchester on 15
September 1830. A train is surely an example of a human-machine system, and one might
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therefore have expected that human factors was a concern already then. Yet it would take
more than a century and one more revolution before human factors became an issue and a
separate discipline. By the beginning of the 20th Century, technological developments had
brought about a proliferation of sources of power. The result was that work became
dependent on many different types of machines, and that systems became larger and more
complex. Existing types of work became more specialized and completely new types of work
began to appear. This led to the development of large and complicated processes that
required specialized training of humans and therefore also specialized work analysis. The
clearest example of that is the discipline of Scientific Management (Taylor, 1911). The basic
idea of Scientific Management was to analyse tasks to determine the most efficient
performance and then select people to achieve the best possible match between task
requirements and capabilities.
Although Scientific Management in many ways meet the common definition of human
factors, the consideration of human capabilities in the design of work were limited to physical
strength and endurance, i.e., to the mechanical aspects of human work. The human was
seen as a component in the work process, but not yet as a factor that could influence the
work process as a whole. In particular, it was not thought necessary to take psychological
issues into account. This changed after the meta-technological developments in the 1940s
that gave rise to what today is known as the information technology revolution. These
developments included the digital computer (ENIAC in 1945), the formulation of the
mathematical theory of communication (1949) and cybernetics (1948), the invention of the
transistor (1947-48), followed ten years later by the invention of the integrated circuit. The
introduction of information technology in work meant that machine capabilities  hence the
demands of humans to control them quickly exceeded what humans could naturally do.
This created what is now called the demand-capacity gap and led to the development of
human factors engineering as we know it today.
2 The First Age: The Human Factor as a Bottleneck
The information technology revolution created work situations where humans appeared
as too imprecise, variable, and slow. Human capacity limitations, in performance and control,
were seen as the reason why system performance (e.g., productivity, precision or speed),
was below what the technologies made possible. The three main solutions that human
factors engineering developed to overcome these limitations were training, design, and
automation. Training, supported by selection, was used to bridge the gap between what
people in general were able to do and the skills. knowledge, and proficiency required
effectively to work with the machines or technology. As technology became more
sophisticated, training often took longer and longer - in extreme cases several years, e.g., for
aircraft pilots or nuclear power plant operators. Design was used to ensure a good fit
between the system and the users, first with regard to the basic ergonomics (anthropometric
characteristics) such as force, posture, reach, size, and shape, and later with regard to the
psychological or cognitive characteristics. Today this is very much an issue of display and
interaction design, but until the mid 1980s most human-machine interfaces were based on
conventional knobs-and-dials technology. Design also covered other issues such as ease of
use, comfort, productive, safety, and aesthetics. Automation, finally, used technology itself to
overcome the problems created by technology, either by directly replacing humans by
automation or by compensating for human weaknesses by smart technology. This created
an uncomfortable dependency that remains to this day.
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2.1 Consequences
Training, design, and automation all required that clear and detailed descriptions of the
activity in question were available. Task analysis therefore soon became a sine qua non for
human factors, not least for how to structure the human-machine interaction (e.g., Miller,
1953). Task analysis made it natural to think of systems and events as being composed of
discrete and identifiable components, and therefore to focus on the characteristics of these
components.. .
Although the primary concern in the first age of human factors was to ensure the
effective use of technology, human factors addressed both the quality of work and the quality
of working. During the first age technology was analogue rather than digital, and both vertical
and horizontal integration was limited. It was therefore both natural and appropriate to
consider problems very much by themselves, as independent rather than as interdependent.
Even after human factors entered the second age, cf., below, the fundamental concerns
remained and were perhaps accentuated by the transition to digital technology. Interface
design, for instance, became very much an issue of information presentation and control.
The continued technological developments made it possible to extend system integration,
and also to automate more and more functions. This slowly changed the nature of work from
tracking and regulating to monitoring and targeting, with consequences for what human
factors was expected to deliver.
3 The Second Age: The Human Factor as a Liability
The second age of human factors was introduced rather abruptly by the accident at the
Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear power plant on March 28, 1979. It was clear even from the
first descriptions of the accident that operator actions had played a significant role in how the
events developed, hence in bringing about the final outcome. This pointed to the necessity of
considering the effects of human actions, and in particular the effects of incorrect human
actions, in the design and operation of human-machine systems.
At first, the established means of training, design, and automation were applied. Training
was used to teach humans not only how to do something but also how to think about it. This
introduced a focus on the cognitive functions involved in, e.g., diagnosis, problem solving,
decision making, and planning. Design was used to ensure that people could cope with an
increasing flow of data and a potential information input overload, and also that they could
perform the required control actions. Automation almost became a panacea in the sense that
it was used wherever possible to take over the tasks and activities that humans were unable
to accomplished or had failed in doing correctly. Yet it soon became clear that automation
could create more problems than it solved (Bainbridge, 1983)
The concern with the human as a liability led to a focus on human error. The need to
model human errors, both quantitatively and qualitative, resulted in a large number of
methods, taxonomies, and models. One of the most important of these was the skill-based,
rule-based, knowledge-based framework proposed by Rasmussen (1986). In addition to
designing systems to overcome or bypass human capacity limitations, it also became
necessary to ensure that human errors were either prevented or that steps were taken to
limit or contain adverse outcomes. This led to a focus on human error identification, often in
terms of human error quantification, and on human error reduction, for instance by finding
ways to enhance human reliability.
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While humans initially were described as fallible machines, it gradually became obvious that
humans differed significantly from technological artefacts, and in particular from information
processing systems, in the sense that humans neither worked with very specific inputs and
outputs, nor were limited to one or a few functions. Technical systems and components are
designed and built to perform with little or no variability, until they have to be replaced.
Humans cannot naturally provide the same constant performance, or even be drilled to do
so, nor should they rightly be expected to.
3.1 Consequences
The primary concern in the second age of human factors was to ensure that human
errors were reduced or eliminated, and that the consequences of such errors could be
contained. The first goal led to an extensive use of automation, and to the mechanisation of
many simple cognitive functions and tasks. The explanations for human errors were initially
sought in the human mind and often described as faulty information processing, but after
some years it became clear that performance failures could be a product of the working
conditions as well as of human errors. The second goal was pursued through the design of
barriers of many types, not least barrier functions such as interlocks or automated recovery.
Other means for error prevention were interface and interaction design combined with
training, and stricter compliance with procedures and prescriptions in some cases supported
by warning or monitoring technologies. The very idea of the human error sustained the view
of humans as independent rather than interdependent.
4 The Third Age: The Human Factor as an Asset
While the second age of human factors was introduced rather abruptly, the transition to
the third age was less obvious. The relentless development of socio-technical systems
gradually created situations where the established ways of thinking were powerless. Case
after case made it clear that it was impossible to ensure the required safe and efficient
system performance by a combination of overcoming human capability limitations and
eliminating human errors. This led to the realisation that humans were not just bottlenecks
or possible sources of error, but also the resource that enabled increasingly large and
incomprehensible socio-technical systems to function both efficiently and safely.
4.1 Tractability and Intractability
In order to control or manage systems and organisations it is necessary to know what
goes on inside them. It is therefore important that a sufficiently clear description or
specification of the system and its functions can be provided. This requirements must, for
instance, be met in order for a system to be analysed, in order for specific tools and solutions
to be designed, in order for its risks to be assessed, and in order for safety to be managed.
That this must be so is obvious if we consider the opposite. If we do not have a clear
description or specification of a system, and/or if we do not know what goes on inside it,
then it is impossible effectively to control it, to design for it, or to make a risk assessment.
These qualities are captured by making a distinction between tractable and intractable
systems, cf., Table 1 below.
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Tractable system Intractable system
Number of details Description are simple with
few details
Description are elaborate with
many details
Comprehensibility Principles of functioning are
known
Principles of functioning are
partly unknown
Stability System does not change
while being described
System changes before
description is completed
Relation to other systems Independence Interdependence
Metaphor Clockwork Teamwork
Table 1: Tractable and intractable systems
Intractable systems are underspecified in the sense that details may be missing or
unavailable (e.g., Clarke, 2000). If a system is underspecified it is clearly not possible to
provide precise procedures or instructions. On the contrary, the people working in the
system, be it at the sharp end or at the blunt end, must be able to use the available
procedures in situations that differ from what was assumed. In other words, it is necessary
that people are able to vary or adjust what they do, to ensure that the system functions as
required and can achieves its operational goals.
4.2 Performance Variability
A highly regular or constant performance is the ideal for machines and technology.
This was also the hidden assumption behind the first and second ages of human factors.
Performance variability, in the form of habitual and/or intentional adjustments made during
actual work, is nevertheless necessary because performance conditions as a rule are
underspecified. Performance variability is more often a strength than a liability, and is
probably the primary reason why socio-technical systems work as well as they do. Humans
are extremely adept at finding effective ways of overcoming problems at work, and this
capability is crucial for both safety and productivity. Human performance can therefore at the
same time both enhance and detract from system safety.
There are also other reasons why human performance cannot be constant or invariable:
x Physiological and/or fundamental psychological characteristics (e.g., affecting
perception and vigilance).x Higher level psychological phenomena such as ingenuity, creativity, and adaptability.x Organizationally induced performance variability, as in meeting external demands
(quality, quantity), stretching resources, substituting goals, etc.x Socially induced variability, as in meeting expectations of oneself or of colleagues,
complying with informal work standards, etc.x Contextually induced performance variability, for instance if the working conditions
are too hot, too noisy, too humid, etc.
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x Performance variability induced by the unpredictability of the domain, e.g., weather
conditions, number of flights, pilot variability, technical problems, etc.
Performance variability is usually noticed on the individual level, where it often, incorrectly,
has been labelled human error. But it may equally well occur collectively, i.e., in the
performance of groups and organisations. In these cases it is less easy to observe, and
therefore only noticed when it leads to undesired outcomes. While such outcomes may be
attributed to organisational failures or accidents, they are in fact due to the interdependence
among the performance of individuals. This interdependence comes about because
performance adjustments in the long run can be efficient only if the behaviour of others is
predictable.
5 The ETTO Principle
Human behaviour - and human performance - can be described as if it was guided by
or followed a principle of efficiency-thoroughness trade-off (the ETTO principle; Hollnagel,
2009). In all that they do people are faced with the problem of how to be both efficient and
thorough at the same time - or rather, how to be sufficiently efficient while being acceptably
thorough. As one might expect, efficiency typically dominates thoroughness, in the sense
that people trade off or sacrifice thoroughness for efficiency. They obviously never do that to
the extent that they take unnecessary risks or are unsafe, at least in their own understanding
of the situation. (It may possibly look different to others.)
In its simplest possible form, the ETTO principle can be stated as follows: In their daily
activities, at work or at leisure, people routinely make a choice between being efficient and
being thorough, since it rarely is possible to be both at the same time. If demands to
productivity or performance are high, thoroughness is reduced until the productivity goals are
met. If demands to safety are high, efficiency is reduced until the safety goals are met.
Efficiency means that the level of investment or amount of resources, including time,
used or needed to achieve a stated goal or objective are kept as low as possible. For
individuals, the decision about how much effort to spend is usually not conscious, but rather
a result of habit, social norms, and established practice. For organisations, it is more likely to
be the result of a direct consideration - although that choice in itself will also be subject to the
ETTO principle. Thoroughness means that an activity is carried out only if the individual or
organisation is confident that the necessary and sufficient conditions for it exist, so that the
activity will achieve its objective and not create any unwanted side-effects. More formally,
thoroughness means that the pre-conditions for an activity are in place, that the execution
conditions can be ensured, and that the outcome(s) will be the intended one(s).
5.1 Consequences
The third age of human factors recognises that our socio-technical systems are complex,
and that individual and collective behaviour therefore cannot be understood in isolation. All
socio-technical systems are underspecified, and underspecified systems can only function if
performance is variable, i.e., if it is adjusted to the current conditions. This means that
individual human performance depends on what happens in the work environment, hence
that there is a mutual dependency. The mission of human factors is therefore not just to
compensate for limited capabilities or to reduce or eliminate error. The mission is instead to
understand the nature of the interdependence, and to develop ways to sustain or strengthen
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the individual and collective performance variability that leads to desired or improved
outcomes as well as to dampen the performance variability that may put safety at risk.
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